A Defense of Hume on Miracles (Princeton Monographs in Philosophy)
Robert J. Fogelin | 2005-01-03 00:00:00 | Princeton University Press | 120 | Philosophy
Since its publication in the mid-eighteenth century, Hume's discussion of miracles has been the target of severe and often ill-tempered attacks. In this book, one of our leading historians of philosophy offers a systematic response to these attacks.
Arguing that these criticisms have--from the very start--rested on misreadings, Robert Fogelin begins by providing a narrative of the way Hume's argument actually unfolds. What Hume's critics (and even some of his defenders) have failed to see is that Hume's primary argument depends on fixing the appropriate standards of evaluating testimony presented on behalf of a miracle. Given the definition of a miracle, Hume quite reasonably argues that the standards for evaluating such testimony must be extremely high. Hume then argues that, as a matter of fact, no testimony on behalf of a religious miracle has even come close to meeting the appropriate standards for acceptance. Fogelin illustrates that Hume's critics have consistently misunderstood the structure of this argument--and have saddled Hume with perfectly awful arguments not found in the text. He responds first to some early critics of Hume's argument and then to two recent critics, David Johnson and John Earman. Fogelin's goal, however, is not to "bash the bashers," but rather to show that Hume's treatment of miracles has a coherence, depth, and power that makes it still the best work on the subject.
Reviews
A Defense of Hume on Miracles is a short book divided into three parts:
1. a clear interpretation of Hume's famous argument against miracles;
2. a look at two supposed refutations, that is Johnson's "Hume, Holism and Miracles" and Earman's "Hume's Abject Failure";
3. a look at how Hume's stance on miracles fits into his philosophy as a whole.
Hume's argument basically consists of two methods of measuring the reliability of testimony: the "direct method", ie. showing the witness is reliable, unbiased, noncontradictory, etc. The more important second method is the "reverse method" in which the probability of the event that is being testified is assessed and then applied to judge the reliability of the testimony.
That is the first part of Hume's essay. The second part applies the reverse test to testimonies of religious miracles and argues that these have continuously failed, and as such has created an enormous barrier for future testimony of religious miracles.
Fogelin argues strongly against two common misinterpretations of Hume, namely that he is using an a-priori argument against miracles, and that Hume's argument is circular because it assumes "uniform experience" to discredit miracles (an argument used by CS Lewis among others). The former is simply false since Hume explicitly gives an example of when testimony would suffice to establish that a miracle has taken place. The latter also reads into Hume's essay what is simply not there - Hume nowhere says reports of miracles are false because we know they never happened. Fogelin explains with a clear example:
"Hume begins with a claim about testimony. On one side we have wide and unproblematic testimony to the effect that when people step into water they do not remain on its surface. On the other side we have isolated reports of people walking across the surface of water. Given testimony of the first kind, how should we evaluate the testimony of the second sort? The testimony of the first sort does not show that the testimony of the second sort is false; it does, however, create a strong presumption - unless countered, a decisively strong presumption - in favor of its falsehood. That is Hume's argument, and there is nothing circular or question-begging about it."
Fogelin shows in part 2 that Johnson commits both misinterpretations, that is, he both says that Hume's argument is circular and that Hume's argument is a-priori. Earman's approach is more subtle, but still flawed. Based on a couple of strong statements of Hume against miracles, Earman thinks Hume thought the probability of miracles was roughly zero. But, as noted earlier, this is incorrect because Hume provided an example of when a miracle could be established by testimony; moreover, it contradicts his epistemic fallibility, as well as a statement elsewhere that "the course of nature may change". So Earman's treatment too is based upon a misreading.
The third part is good too. Overall, Fogelin's book is written in clear style, offers excellent insights and provides a thorough defense against some more vocal critics of Hume. This all more than compensates for the short length of the book. Highly recommended for people interested in Hume's argument against miracles, or interested in miracles in general.
Reviews
How do you defend circular reasoning? Hume begs the question. How do you know if uniform experience is against miracles unless you know all the reports of miracles are false, the very question we're trying to answer? To know all the reports of miracles are false, Hume would have to be all-knowing, which contradicts his own purported empiricism. In "basic" logic texts this is called "begging the question." Moreover, Hume wants to assert that the cause of all physical events is always empirical even though modern physics proved you cannot posit a universal principle of causality. Hume didn`t have the benefit of good logic nor good science.
Hume was well answered in his day by Archbishop Richard Whately in his essay "HISTORIC DOUBTS RELATIVE TO NAPOLEON BUONAPARTE" which is available free on-line. John Earman did a terrific job in refuting Hume in recent book "Hume's Abject Failure: The Argument Against Miracles." C. S. Lewis also did a lucid critique in his book "Miracles." Jesus Christ did the best refutation when He rose from the dead. Unless you can rise from the dead, Jesus is in a better position to explain how He did it.
Reviews
After reading Earman's HUME'S ABJECT FAILURE, I thought Hume's argument against miracles was dead. Now, after having reading Fogelin's A DEFENSE OF HUME ON MIRACLES, I appreciate the argument more than ever. Fogelin's exposition makes sense of a number of things about "Of Miracles" that always puzzled me. Fogelin effectively argues that Hume never offered an a priori argument, or even a knockdown argument against testimony on behalf on miracles, and shows how Part II of "Of Miracles" is just as essential to Hume's real argument as Part I.
A DEFENSE OF HUME ON MIRACLES also contains responses to the recent criticisms of Johnson and Earman, a discussion of how Hume's argument against miracles relates to other aspects of his philosophy, an appendix treating Hume's use and abuse of Tillotson, and a second appendix reprinting "Of Miracles", which the reader will definitely want to have handy.
The one thing I felt would have made the book even better was detailed assessment by Fogelin of the merits of the argument he reconstructs, which I thought still makes very interesting and controversial claims about testimony and evidence. Although Fogelin seems sympathetic, it is often difficult to tell whether he is agreeing with Hume altogether, or just pointing out that he did not make one or another mistake commonly attributed to him. But proper exegesis and interpretation must come before assessment, and Fogelin's book goes a long way towards establishing that necessary foundation.
Reviews
Are you looking for an accessible, clear, and, best of all, accurate account of Hume's argument in "Of Miracles" (section 10 of his *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*)?
If so, you've found it.
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